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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 99-3280 
 
WOODWIND ESTATES, LTD., 
 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
W. J. GRETKOWSKI; LARRY SEBRING; 
JAMES DECKER, Individually, and in their capacity as 
Supervisors of Stroud Township; W. TAYLOR WENCK; 
EDWARD CRAMER; FRANK HERTING; 
JOAN KEIPER, Individually, and as members of the 
Planning Commission of Stroud Township; 
STROUD TOWNSHIP, MONROE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 97-cv-00472) 
District Judge: Honorable James F. McClure, Jr. 
 
Argued December 7, 1999 
 
Before: SLOVITER, ROTH and COWEN, Circuit Judg es 
 
(Filed: February 28, 2000) 
 
       Marshall E. Anders, Esq. (Argued) 
       802 Main Street 
       Stroudsburg, PA 18360 
 
        Counsel for Appellant 
 
 
  
       Eugene F. Hickey, II, Esq. (Argued) 
       Schneider, Gelb, Goffer & Hickey 
       400 Spruce Street, Suite 500 
       Scranton, PA 18503 
 
        Counsel for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.S 1983 
brought by plaintiff Woodwind Estates, Ltd. (Woodwind) 
against defendants Stroud Township (the "Township") and 
individual officers of the Township. The suit emanated from 
the failure of the Township to approve development plans 
for specific property. The central issue on appeal is whether 
the District Court properly granted defendants' motion for 
judgment as a matter of law on Woodwind's S 1983 
substantive due process claim. Because we find that the 
District Court erred in granting this motion, we will reverse 
and remand for further proceedings. 
 
Woodwind is a Pennsylvania limited partnership which at 
all times relevant to this action sought to build a 
subdivision development on seventy-five acres in Stroud 
Township, Pennsylvania. In August 1995, Woodwind was 
awarded approximately $1.1 million in federal low income 
housing tax credits by the Pennsylvania Housing Finance 
Agency ("PHFA") for developing an "affordable housing" 
project. The project was to consist of one hundred single 
family homes for low income families. In order to retain the 
federal income tax credits, PHFA required Woodwind to 
complete the project by December 31, 1997. Woodwind 
sought to obtain subdivision approval for the project 
pursuant to the Township's Subdivision and Land 
Development Ordinance ("SALDO"). 
 
Woodwind's first step in the approval process was the 
submission of a preliminary development plan ("the Plan"). 
On March 18, 1996, it submitted the Plan and supporting 
information to the Township. Pursuant to the Township's 
ordinance the Plan was evaluated initially by the Stroud 
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Township Planning Commission. The Planning Commission 
was to issue an advisory opinion to the Board of 
Supervisors which in turn would make the final decision 
regarding approval. 
 
At a meeting on March 27, 1996, the Planning 
Commission first considered the Plan. At the meeting, the 
attorney for the Planning Commission advised the 
Commission that the Plan satisfied the criteria for approval 
as a subdivision. 
 
The March 27, 1996, meeting also was attended by a 
citizens group known as the "Concerned Neighbors of 
Woodwind Estates" who opposed the project because they 
did not want low-income residents living in the 
neighborhood. The citizens group was represented at the 
meeting by a private attorney, Marc Wolfe. On behalf of the 
citizens group, Wolfe urged the Planning Commission to 
deny approval for the Preliminary Plan insisting instead 
that Woodwind seek approval for the project as a planned 
unit development ("PUD"). The requirements for approval of 
a PUD are more onerous, stringent, and time-consuming 
than the requirements for subdivision approval. 
 
During the course of the meeting on March 27, 1996, 
members of the Planning Commission echoed the concerns 
of the citizens group about the income-level and the 
socioeconomic background of prospective tenants from the 
Woodwind project, and the potential adverse economic 
effects of the project on local property values. None of these 
concerns, however, are conditions for subdivision approval 
under the Township's ordinance. 
 
On March 27, 1996, the Planning Commission advised 
Woodwind that it would not review the Preliminary Plan 
because it was an "incomplete submission" lacking certain 
technical information. App. at 690. Woodwind thereafter 
submitted a revised Preliminary Plan ("the Revised Plan") 
which contained the requested information. 
 
At a meeting on April 24, 1996, the attorney for the 
Planning Commission advised the Commission that the 
Revised Plan met the criteria for subdivision approval. 
Nevertheless, attorney Wolfe urged the Planning 
Commission to deny approval for the Revised Plan, again 
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insisting that Woodwind obtain approval for the project as 
a PUD rather than as a subdivision. 
 
The Planning Commission took no action on the Revised 
Plan for approximately six months. Finally, on October 30, 
1996, the Planning Commission voted 4-2 to recommend to 
the Board of Supervisors to deny approval of the Revised 
Plan. 
 
The Board of Supervisors adopted the recommendation of 
the Planning Commission voting unanimously to deny 
approval. Shortly after the vote, the Board of Supervisors 
issued a written notice denying approval, which notice gave 
no reason to Woodwind for the denial. Attorney Wolfe 
contacted a member of the Board of Supervisors and 
advised him that the Board's denial letter was legally 
inadequate because it did not state any reason for the 
decision. 
 
Following the above conversation, Wolfe himself drafted a 
second letter of denial which he sent to the Board of 
Supervisors but not to Woodwind setting forth the alleged 
violations or shortcomings of the Revised Plan. Quite 
obviously Woodwind was not even in a position to respond 
to Wolfe's letter. Relying heavily upon significant portions of 
the denial letter drafted by Wolfe, the attorney for the Board 
of Supervisors subsequently sent a letter dated November 
27, 1996, notifying Woodwind of the reasons for the denial. 
The letter included as the primary reason for the denial the 
exact same reason which Wolfe previously had proposed in 
his draft: "The Board of Supervisors considers the above 
application to constitute a Planned Unit Development in 
that the project includes residential units located on a tract 
of land at least 50 acres in size which is planned for 
development in its entirety under single ownership or 
control." App. at 707. 
 
After the Revised Plan was denied, Woodwind determined 
that it was impossible to complete the project by the 
December 1997 deadline. When Woodwind could not meet 
the deadline, PHFA subsequently withdrew financing and 
the project was canceled. 
 
Woodwind initiated this action by filing a complaint in 
United States District Court for the Middle District of 
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Pennsylvania alleging that the defendants unlawfully denied 
its application for a planned real estate subdivision. Named 
as defendants were Stroud Township and seven individual 
defendants who are members of the Planning Commission 
and Board of Supervisors. Woodwind brought suit under 42 
U.S.C. SS 1983 (Count 1), 1981 (Count 2), 1985 (Count 3), 
and various supplemental state law claims (Counts 4-6). 
 
Before submitting the case to the jury, the District Court 
granted defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law 
under Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The District Court subsequently issued a memorandum 
explaining its dismissal of Woodwind's S 1983 substantive 
due process claim. 
 
Woodwind appeals only the dismissal of its S 1983 
substantive due process claim. We will reverse and remand 
for further proceedings. 
 
We exercise plenary review of an order granting or 
denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law and apply 
the same standard as the District Court. See Lightning 
Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). 
"The question is not whether there is literally no evidence 
supporting the party against whom the motion is directed 
but whether there is evidence upon which the jury could 
properly find a verdict for that party." Patzig v. O'Neill, 577 
F.3d 841, 846 (3d Cir. 1978) (citation omitted) (quotation 
omitted). Such a motion should be granted only if, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant 
and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable 
inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury 
reasonably could find liability. See Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 
1166. 
 
Substantive due process "is an area of the law`famous 
for its controversy, and not known for its simplicity.' " 
DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 598 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (quoting Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 
709, 716 (5th Cir. 1987)). On the one hand, federal courts 
are reluctant to sit as appeal boards for disputes between 
land developers and a Township's planning body. On the 
other hand, developers have a due process right to be free 
from "arbitrary and irrational zoning actions." Arlington 
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Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corporation, 429 U.S. 252, 
263 (1973). During the past decade this court has been 
called upon quite frequently to grapple with the obvious 
tension between these two principles in a line of 
substantive due process cases. See, e.g., Blanche Road 
Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 1995); 
DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 
1995); Parkway Garage v. Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685 (3d Cir. 
1993); Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 
F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1991); Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124 (3d 
Cir. 1988). 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, that"no 
State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without the due process of law . . . ." U.S. Const. amend 
XIV, S 1. To prevail on a substantive due process claim 
under S1983, a plaintiff must establish as a threshold 
matter that he has a protected property interest to which 
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protection 
applies. 
 
Woodwind argues that it has a protected property right in 
the approval of its development plans. Woodwind contends 
that so long as the development plans met all the 
requirements of the Township's subdivision ordinance it 
had an absolute right to approval of the plans as 
submitted. The defendants argue that Woodwind has no 
protected property interest in the approval. Even though 
Woodwind's plans indisputably met the requirements of the 
Township's subdivision ordinance, according to the 
defendants they nonetheless had the discretion (based 
upon some unspecified authority) to deny approval of the 
plans as submitted. 
 
This court has recognized "that the issue of whether and 
when state-created property interests invoke substantive 
due process concerns has not been decided by the Supreme 
Court." Deblasio, 53 F.3d at 598. In this circuit, " `not all 
property interests worthy of procedural due process 
protection are protected by the concept of substantive due 
process.' " Id. at 598 (quoting Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 
239, 244 (3d Cir. 1989)). In Independent Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Authority, 103 F.3d 1165 (3d Cir. 
1997), we stated that "a substantive due process claim 
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grounded in an arbitrary exercise of governmental authority 
may be maintained only where the plaintiff has been 
deprived of a `particular quality of property interest," id. at 
1179, and further explained that "all of these cases 
involv[ing] zoning decisions, building permits, or other 
governmental permission required for some intended use of 
land owned by the plaintiffs," id. at n. 12, implicated the 
kind of property interest protected by substantive due 
process. It follows that the holder of a land use permit has 
a property interest if a state law or regulation limits the 
issuing authority's discretion to restrict or revoke the 
permit by requiring that the permit issue as a matter of 
right upon compliance with terms and conditions 
prescribed by the statute or ordinance. See, e.g., 
Bituminous Materials, Inc. v. Rice County, Minnesota , 126 
F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 
In this matter, the procedures for approval of subdivision 
plans are set forth in the Township's subdivision ordinance. 
In the section captioned "Specific Procedures For Plan 
Submission and Approval," the ordinance specifically 
provides as follows: ". . . the Commission shall determine 
the extent to which the [subdivision] plan complies with the 
Ordinance and shall recommend to the Board of 
Supervisors that the plan be approved entirely, that it be 
conditionally approved, or that it be disapproved." App. at 
503. Under the ordinance, the plan submitted must be 
approved when it complies with all objective criteria for a 
subdivision.1 In light of the fact that the plan which 
Woodwind submitted indisputably satisfied all of the 
requirements for approval under the ordinance, and 
because the ordinance substantially limits the Township's 
discretion regarding approval, we conclude that Woodwind 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Likewise, Pennsylvania courts have stated that"a subdivision plan 
must be approved if it complies with [the] applicable regulations . . . ." 
Anderson v. Board of Supervisors of Price Twp., Monroe County, Pa., 437 
A.2d 1308, 1309 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981); See also Pace Resources, Inc. v. 
Shrewsbury Twp. Planning Commission, 492 A.2d 818, 821 (Pa. Cmwlth. 
1985); Goodman v. Board of Commissioners of the Township of Whitehall, 
411 A.2d 838, 841 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). 
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has a protected property interest under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.2 
 
Along with establishing a protected property interest, 
Woodwind also must demonstrate that it was the victim of 
"a governmental action [that] was arbitrary, irrational, or 
tainted by improper motive" in order to show a substantive 
due process violation under S 1983. Bello v. Walker, 840 
F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988); Accord Parkway Garage v. 
Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 692 (3d Cir. 1993) (a violation of 
substantive due process rights is shown where the 
government's actions in a particular case were "in fact 
motivated by bias, bad faith or improper motive"); Blanche 
Road Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 263 (3d Cir. 
1995) (same). Evidence that the government acted 
improperly for "reasons unrelated to the merits of the 
application for the permits" may support a finding that the 
government arbitrarily or irrationally abused its power in 
violation of substantive due process. Bello, 840 F.2d at 
1129; See also Pace Resources Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 
808 F.2d 1023, 1035 (3d Cir. 1987) (irrationality not shown 
absent proof that government took actions against 
developer "for reasons unrelated to land use planning"). In 
disputed factual situations, the determination of the 
existence of improper motive or bad faith is properly made 
by the jury as the finder of fact. See, e.g. , Bello, 840 F.2d 
at 1130; Midnight Sessions Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 
F.2d 667, 683 (3d Cir. 1991). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. According to the defendants, the District Court correctly dismissed the 
case "on the ground that the developer failed to establish a 
constitutionally protected property right." Defendants' Br. at 8. If the 
District Court dismissed the substantive due process claim on that 
basis, it was in error. Woodwind in fact had a protected property interest 
for the reasons explained above. 
 
It is not entirely clear to us, however, whether the District Court 
granted judgment as a matter of law on that ground. The District Court 
initially stated that it was "[a]ssuming a protected property interest" 
although subsequently it appears to have taken the view that Woodwind 
had no such protected property interest. App. at 9-10. In any event, the 
District Court was in error by refusing to submit Woodwind's substantive 
due process claim to the jury on the issue of improper motive or bad 
faith. 
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Applying this standard, we have not hesitated to vacate 
a grant of summary judgment or a judgment as a matter of 
law where the evidence at least plausibly showed that the 
government took actions against the developer for 
indefensible reasons unrelated to the merits of the zoning 
dispute. One example is Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124 (3d 
Cir. 1988). Bello involved a substantive due process claim 
under S 1983 brought by a developer against the municipal 
council. The plaintiff in Bello presented evidence that the 
defendants "improperly interfered with the process by 
which the municipality issued building permits, and that 
they did so for partisan political or personal reasons 
unrelated to the merits of the application for the permits." 
Id. at 1129. The defendants in Bello presented evidence 
that the building permits at issue were denied for legitimate 
zoning reasons thus presenting an arguably rational 
ground for the decision. Id. at 1130. Because there was a 
genuine factual dispute over whether the defendants had 
denied the permit based upon an improper motive, we 
vacated the grant of summary judgment by the District 
Court. See also Deblasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 
F.3d 592, 600-01 (3d Cir. 1995) (vacating summary 
judgment where genuine dispute as to whether denial of 
permit by governmental decision maker was motivated by 
improper personal financial reasons); Parkway Garage, Inc. 
v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 696-99 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(vacating directed verdict where jury could reasonably infer 
that denial of permit by governmental decision maker was 
motivated by improper economic reasons). 
 
In Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253 (3d 
Cir. 1995), the plaintiff presented evidence that the 
defendants had engaged in a pattern of improperly refusing 
to release and issue certain permits as part of an effort "to 
delay and ultimately to shut down" the proposed 
subdivision development. 57 F.3d at 260. We held that the 
intentional blocking or delaying of the issuance of permits 
for reasons unrelated to the merits of the permit application 
violates principles of substantive due process and is 
actionable under S 1983. Id. at 268-69. We vacated the 
order of the District Court granting the defendants' motion 
for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a) and ordered a new 
trial. 
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This case is similar to Bello and Blanche Road. Woodwind 
presented the following evidence at trial: (1) the defendants 
had no legitimate basis under the ordinance for demanding 
information about the socioeconomic background and 
income-levels of prospective tenants as a condition of 
subdivision approval; (2) the defendants denied approval for 
the plan by adopting significant portions of a letter drafted 
by the private attorney for the citizens group which 
vigorously opposed the development for improper reasons; 
and (3) the defendants intentionally blocked or delayed the 
issuance of the permit for subdivision approval because 
they were aware that by doing so the developer would be 
unable to meet the building deadline for financing the 
project. All of this in combination could provide a jury with 
a basis from which it could reasonably find that the 
decision of the defendants to deny approval was made in 
bad faith or was based upon an improper motive. See, e.g., 
Bello, 840 F.2d at 1130. 
 
Our conclusion here is bolstered by our narrow scope of 
review. On a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, the 
non-moving party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences. " `The trial judge, in his review of the evidence, 
and this court, in its own appellate review, must expose the 
evidence to the strongest light favorable to the party against 
whom the motion is made and give him every advantage of 
every fair and reasonable inference.' " Parkway Garage, 5 
F.3d at 698 (quoting Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Videofreeze 
Corp., 540 F.2d 1171, 1178 (3d Cir. 1976)). As we stated in 
Fireman's Fund,"we cannot say (as a matter of law) that the 
record is deficient of that `minimum quantum of evidence 
from which a jury might reasonably afford relief '." 540 F.2d 
at 1178. Woodwind adduced sufficient evidence to overcome 
the motion. The District Court erred in dismissing the 
S 1983 substantive due process claim. Accordingly, we will 
remand for further proceedings. 
 
Next, the supervisor defendants contend that their Rule 
50(a) motion should be upheld on the alternative ground 
that they are entitled to qualified immunity for their 
decision to deny Woodwind's application for subdivision 
approval. According to the supervisors, they are entitled to 
qualified immunity simply because they were relying upon 
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the recommendation of the planning commission and the 
township solicitor. We disagree. 
 
The test for determining whether government officials are 
entitled to qualified immunity for their actions, as set forth 
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) is that 
"government officials performing discretionary functions 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar 
as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known." 457 U.S. at 818. In the instant 
case, however, when the evidence is viewed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, it is clear that the supervisor 
defendants could not have reasonably believed that their 
conduct did not violate plaintiff 's rights. Under the local 
ordinance, the Woodwind plan as submitted must have 
been approved as a subdivision because it satisfied all of 
the objective criteria. Yet the supervisor defendants denied 
approval for the subdivision plan. The supervisor 
defendants have not shown that their interpretation or 
understanding of the ordinance was reasonable or that 
Pennsylvania law on the subject was unclear. Accordingly, 
the defense of qualified immunity is not available to the 
supervisor defendants in the instant matter. See, e.g., 
Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 269 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (no qualified immunity for township supervisors 
where they could not reasonably have believed that their 
conduct did not violate plaintiff 's constitutional rights).3 
 
The Township also contends that its Rule 50(a) motion 
should be upheld on the alternative ground that there was 
insufficient evidence from which a jury couldfind a 
Township policy sanctioning conduct that violated 
plaintiff 's constitutional rights. In order to establish 
Township liability under S 1983, "a plaintiff must show that 
an official who has the power to make policy is responsible 
for either the affirmative proclamation of a policy or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court did not specifically address the issue of whether 
the 
planning commissioners were entitled to qualified immunity. 
Nonetheless, we conclude that the planning commissioners are not 
entitled to qualified immunity for similar reasons as those discussed 
above. 
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acquiescence in a well-settled custom." Blanche Rd. Corp. v. 
Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 269 n. 16 (3d Cir. 1995). It 
is hornbook law that "actions by those with final authority 
for making a decision in the municipality constitute official 
policy for purposes of S 1983." Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal 
Jurisdiction, S 8.5 at 479 (3d ed. 1999). 
 
Applying this test in Blanche Road, we held that there 
was sufficient evidence of an official policy to establish 
Township liability under S 1983 because the Township 
supervisors had final, unreviewable authority for making 
the decision to deny the permits sought by the plaintiff. 57 
F.3d at 269 n.16. Similarly, here the supervisor defendants 
indisputably had final, unreviewable authority for making 
the decision. Accordingly, Woodwind's evidence, if believed, 
is sufficient to establish Township liability under S 1983. 
 
For the above reasons, we will reverse the District Court's 
order, granting defendants' Rule 50(a) motion, and we will 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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